A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly challenging because of the strong asymmetries among nations. We identify a solution, the Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium, that defines the relative contributions of players in differing size (or preference intensity) to reflect cheap riding incentives, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. Players start by establishing the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as a base point. From that point they apply either the principles of the Nash Bargaining Solution or the Lindahl Equilibrium to proceed to the Pareto frontier. We apply our theory to climate change mitigation, a critical international public good. Having examined the Nordhaus Climate Club proposal, we test the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium model using individual nations' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions pledged at the Paris Climate Change Conference. As hypothesized, larger nations made much larger pledges in proportion to their Gross National Incomes.
I Introduction
Samuelson's famed condition for the efficient provision of a public good is that the sum of agents' marginal rates of substitution of private goods for the public good equal the marginal cost of the good. To identify the efficient level requires that costs and individuals' preferences be known or readily inferred. To achieve that level is a bigger challenge. The challenge can be met given three conditions: (1) the good is centrally provided; (2) the center has a coercive mechanism for financing any level of expenditure; and (3) the political system operates to promote efficiency. These three conditions are most likely to be met if there is a benevolent government with taxing authority providing the good.
Unfortunately, for many critical public goods no government unit is responsible for provision. We refer to such goods as having No Central Authority (NCA). This often implies that "financing" must come from voluntary contributions by agents. The contributions may be set through a negotiation, formal or informal, or the agents may just decide independently how much to contribute. Contributions are possibly of money, but possibly also of factors of production, such as volunteer services, that help produce the good. Sometimes the agents make direct in-kind contributions of the good itself.
The great challenge for NCA goods is that the potential contributors have strong incentives not to contribute, since they get as much from provision by others as they do from provision themselves. While the term "free riding" is typically used to describe such situations, in many cases we see less extreme behavior, which we term as cheap riding. If the potential contributor gets a substantial portion of the benefits from a public good, or if he or she enjoys separate benefits from the action of contributing that are quite apart from the public good, 1 then he or she will likely contribute a positive amount, although that amount 1 An example of this separate benefit in the climate-change-mitigation context is that a nation may have incentive to cut back some emissions if there are opportunities to link trade negotiations or club membership to the strength climate effort. McLean and Stone (2012) find that most nations that ratified the Kyoto Protocol or that imposed restrictions on their carbon emissions were either part of the European Union or nations that hoped to establish ties to or become part of EU. would still be lower than what efficiency would require. Indeed, as Mancur Olson famously showed in The Logic of Collective Action, in the absence of a central authority, self-interested entities will provide for the public good only if they are incentivized by private benefits, such as prestige or networking, that are quite distinct from advancing the group interest (Olson, 1965) .
The cheap-riding problem is likely reinforced if, in addition, some players are little and some are big. The little players, having little ability or incentive to boost the overall level of the public good, will pursue their self-interest and ride very cheaply. At the Nash Equilibrium, what in this context is the Alliance Equilibrium (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) , overall provision will be woefully inefficient.
We thus focus on the provision of NCA goods by asymmetrical players. The provision of international public goods, such as battling ISIS, fighting against antibiotic resistance, and confronting climate change, falls under this category. Our descriptive model shows that voluntary contributions from small nations relative to their national incomes will be well below those of large nations. We also show that efforts to get nations to contribute proportionally, such as a uniform carbon tax, will founder because they do not recognize the incentive of small nations to ride cheaply.
Recognizing this, we develop a prescriptive model that takes the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as the starting point. From there, we consider two Pareto-improving paths to the Pareto frontier. One adapts the Nash Bargaining solution; the other relies on the principle of the Lindahl Equilibrium. In our illustrative numerical example, the two outcomes are remarkably similar.
In our penultimate section, we consider the implications of our model for international climate agreements. We first discuss the Nordhaus Climate Club proposal, and indicate ways his proposals might be adjusted to recognize the extreme cheap riding incentives for small nations. An empirical section then focuses on individual nations' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. As hypothesized, small nations made much smaller pledges than large nations relative to their national incomes. Neither vulnerability to climate change nor per capita income affects this pattern.
Following Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) , numerous papers have examined the under-provision of public goods with no central authority, including the effect of group size (for example, Isaac and Walker [1998] ), the implications of individual heterogeneity (for example, Boadway and Hayashi [1999] ; Callander and Harstad [2015] ), the role of uncertainty (see Kolstad [2007] and the literature reviewed therein), and the validity of the Nash assumption (for example, Cornes and Sandler [1983] ; Sudgen [1985] ).
Given that NCA goods are typically under provided, a number of solutions have been proposed. Arce M. and Sandler (2001) propose setting up a super-national organization that sends signals to nations in order to induce correlated equilibria that are Pareto superior to Nash equilibria. Gerber and Wichardt (2009) study a two-stage mechanism where players commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage. They show that properly designed deposits support prior commitment and full ex post contributions as a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium. Barrett (1994) represents public good provision in a repeated prisoners' dilemma game and shows that cooperation can be both individually and collectively rational. Similarly, Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou (2011) cast the public good provision game in a repeated game setting and argue that dynamic concerns can enforce efficiency. Abul Naga and Jones (2012) discuss the role of other-regarding preferences such as altruism in bringing about efficient provision. One strand of literature studies matching schemes (for example, Barrett [1990], Falkinger, Hackl and Bruckner [1996] ; Boadway, Song and Tremblay [2011] ; Rubbelke [2011, 2014] ), in which players decide on the unconditional and conditional (matching) contributions to the public good. This process can lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive unconditional contributions. However, all those solutions either assume away or do not sufficiently address the asymmetry inherent in players' situations.
We proceed as follows. Section II discusses international public goods and the challenges to providing them in efficient quantities. Section III sets up the model. Section IV demonstrates cheap riding in the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. Section V then shows a shortcoming of the Lindahl Equilibrium, a famed prior attempt to deal with efficient provision in an asym- 
II Alliance and International Public Good
The provision of international public goods is challenging for two reasons. First, forces that at times motivate contributions by individuals -such as warm glow, prestige or self interest -will rarely be sufficient to motivate nearly sufficient contributions by nations.
Second, and more importantly, the potential providers are very differently situated. Some are rich, some poor; and some are big, some little; on any level of the public good, some will secure much greater benefits from its provision than will others. Thus, China with a population of 1.3 billion, the world's second largest economy, a significant pollution problem, and the intention and ability to lead in the production of green energy technologies, will benefit greatly from the effective control of greenhouse gases. Landlocked Laos, with fewer than 7 million citizens, would benefit little.
The theory of alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) was developed to address just such a situation. Its principal lesson is that those who benefit more from the good will contribute disproportionately more to its provision. Thus, in a world with two nations that are otherwise alike but with one nation twice as big as the other, the big nation will end up contributing significantly more than twice as much as the little nation. Precisely this pattern is observed where the US provides vastly disproportionately in combatting ISIS, 2 or where Saudi Arabia cut its oil production far more below its optimum than did other OPEC nations when OPEC was still hanging together to cut production. 3 The Alliance Equilibrium, as discussed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) , is a Nash Equilibrium, where each player takes as given the strategies of all other players.
The question then arises as to why the alliance members do not get together and bargain their way to an efficient equilibrium. Such an approach might have potential if the members were all similarly situated, and the number of members were not too large. In a negotiation, a natural focal point in the sense of Schelling (1960) 4 would be that each member contributes the same; none could expect to pay less than the others. In such a symmetric situation, with only a few players, they could merely identify and agree to the optimal per capita contribution. Positing that contributions could be monitored, efficiency would be achieved.
In the situation that prevails in real life across nations, however, matters are far from symmetric. Even if the individuals within the nations were identical, for example in income, the little nations could expect the bigger nations to contribute more, arguing correctly that given proportional contributions big nations benefit much more at the margin. However, determining the appropriate ratio of big to little contributions would present a challenge. Big and little nations would respectively advance arguments as to why the ratio should be smaller or larger. As a result, agreement is unlikely. With each nation following its own principles, under provision is to be expected. Prior to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to 2 Pentagon officials complained that some of the 64 partner nations and regional groups, mostly the Arab allies which are smaller nations, are not doing enough. See the news coverage at: http://www.latimes. com/world/middleeast/la-na-isis-coalition-20160201-story.html.
3 Griffin and Xiong (1997) find that small producers (such as Gabon, Qatar, Algeria, Libya, Indonesia and Nigeria) were subsidized at the expense of large producers (especially Saudi Arabia) in the OPEC arrangement, a phenomenon they call the "small producer bias". 4 Schelling (1960) proposes focal points as an intuitive and practical way to coordinate behavior; in many cases a player has "expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do". He suggested that focal points "may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other".
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that took place in Paris in December 2015, individual nations, big and little, had submitted the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that were later included in the new international climate agreement. Following the arguments above, since a nation's pledges were voluntarily made, the sum of pledged reductions was woefully below what will be required to hold the warming by 2100 below 1.5-2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial times. That is the value that most climate scientists think is probably the maximum level the Earth can sustain without incurring devastating damages from climate change. 5 We fully recognize such asymmetry, and develop a simple and intuitive solution. It defines the relative contributions of players of differing size in a manner that both caters to the strong incentive of little players to ride cheaply, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. The analysis recognizes that such mechanisms are not currently in place, and that most alliance efforts lead to total outputs that are well below what would be optimal. In other words, there are agreements requiring greater contributions from all that would represent substantial Pareto improvements. We seek a principles-based approach to defining such an agreement.
III Model Setup
Index the players in the model by i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, and let the contribution of each player to the public good be m i ≥ 0. For simplicity, side payments are ruled out. 6 The public good is simply the sum of all individual contributions, M = i m i (we discuss the imperfect substitutability case in the Appendix). Denote the sum of contributions by players other than i by M −i = j =i m j . Player i gets benefit V i (M ) from the public good.
Since we are considering in-kind contributions, as is the norm with international public 5 Indeed, Hohne et al. (2015) finds that the unconditional reduction pledges in INDCs would lead to a median warming of around 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100 with the full range of 2.2 to 3.4 degrees Celsius. The European Commission also states that "[the INDCs] are not yet enough to keep global warming below 2 degrees celsius" on its Climate Action web page at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/ negotiations/paris/index_en. htm. 6 In the real world, direct side payments between nations are likely politically infeasible. Indirect side payments are sometimes used. See our further discussion in Subsection VII.I and Footnote 19. goods, we allow players to receive private benefits from their own contributions, quite apart from the public good. Thus, for example, a nation's armed forces contribute to the deterrent level of a military alliance. However, they are also available to assist in the case of a natural disaster. A nation's efforts to curb GHGs by developing clean energy technologies would simultaneously advance its high tech capabilities. In addition, a nation may value the respect that other nations pay to it when it contributes to the public good. Represent this private benefit as B i (m i ).
The cost to player i of providing m i is K i (m i ). Note, because we are dealing with a situation where contributions are in kind, we might expect the marginal cost of contribution to increase sharply as one contributes more; that is, K can be not only positive, but
For notational simplicity, in what follows we will just use C i (m i ) to represent the net private cost, K i (m i ) − B i (m i ), so that the utility functions can be written as
Throughout the paper we assume that utility functions are common knowledge.
IV Alliance Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium
To demonstrate cheap riding, we first present the Alliance Equilibrium (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) . It is essentially a Nash Equilibrium, an allocation (m N i ) i∈N (where the superscript N stands for Nash) such that each player's choice is a best respond to what the others do. That is, for each i ∈ N :
Proposition IV.1. An Alliance/Nash Equilibrium exists if for each i, V i > 0, C i > 0, and at least one of the following inequalities is strict:
Proof. We prove it in three steps. First, we show that the the best response function g
exists, is unique, continuous, and non-increasing. Then we use the Brouwer fixed point theorem 8 to show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we show uniqueness if also
Step 1. There are two cases.
, then under the conditions given, there is a unique intersection of V i (·), the marginal benefit curve, and C i (·), the marginal cost curve, which represents the best response.
for any m i > 0, and hence the best response is 0. Figure I provides a straightforward graphical proof. To show that the best response function is non-increasing, in the first case, increasing M −i weakly lowers the marginal benefit curve and thus shifts the intersection weakly to the left along the horizontal axis, making the best response weakly smaller. In the second case, an increase in M −i weakly lowers the marginal benefit curve, so that the best response stays at 0. That the best response function is continuous is obvious.
Step 2. A Nash Equilibrium is a fixed point of (m i ) i∈N = g((m i ) i∈N ), where the i-th element of the vector g((m i ) i∈N ) is i's best response function evaluated at the sum of others' contributions, g * i (M −i ). To use the Brouwer fixed point theorem to establish the existence of a fixed point, it suffices to show that the domain of g is a convex compact set, and that the range of g is contained in its domain. Indeed, without loss of generality we can restrict the domain of m i for each i to [0, max i g * i (0)], because no player will ever want to contribute more than what he or she would as the sole contributor. As a result, the domain of g is a closed rectangle, and it
is thus convex and compact. The range of g is contained in the domain because
for any M −i ≥ 0 and for any i as g * i (·) is non-increasing.
Step 3. To use Corollary 1 in Folmer and Mouche (2004) , take individual player's action
Then, the conditions in Corollary 1 hold. In particular,
is strictly decreasing in m i and decreasing in M , if C i > 0 and V i ≤ 0. Thus, by
Corollary 1, there exists at most one Nash Equilibrium. With the existence result we establish in Step 2, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium.
We now discuss one important property of the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium, first proposed in Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . Positing that nations differ only in size (a parameter in the utility functions, more below), 9 big nations will contribute more than in proportion to their size in the Alliance Equilibrium. Taking GNP as the measure of nation size, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) provide an intuitive proof as follows: suppose by way of contradiction that the big nation, which has twice the GNP of the little nation, contributes twice as much in the Alliance Equilibrium. The Alliance Equilibrium requires that the marginal rate of substitution of the private good for the public good (MRS) equal the marginal cost, which, in our setup, means that
This requirement is not met if the big nation contributes twice as much, because by their definition of nation size, V 1 (M ) = 2V 2 (M ) and C 1 (m 1 ) = C 2 (m 2 ) at m 1 = 2m 2 , so that the MRS of the big nation is twice that of the little. This implies that the big nation would want to contribute even more and/or the little nation even less, until they reach the equilibrium requirement.
We generalize their insights with a more general definition of nation "size". Size is defined here as a variable such that for two nations with a given ratio of the values of that variable, the MRS, or the "bang for its additional contribution", of the big nation is strictly higher than that of the little when contributions are at that ratio. That is, if the size
This is a more general definition than that in Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) , because while the case where
An example of the first case would be using population as a size measure for two otherwise identical nations in the context of GHG emissions reduction; the big nation has twice as many people to benefit from an additional unit of global reduction, and achieves twice as much reduction by simply making everyone to copy the abatement behavior from their counterparts in the little nation. An example of the second case is using Gross National Income (GNI) as the size measure for two nations that also differ in vulnerability and technology. The US may have the same marginal benefit from global GHG reduction as does Japan given that the US is less vulnerable albeit it has more wealth at stake. Contributing at the wealth ratio, the US may still find it cheaper to abate on the margin than Japan given that Japan is already very carbon-lean. The Alliance Equilibrium will thus have the US contribute disproportionally more than Japan. 10
As a numerical example, we posit that We will now take a brief excursion to discuss a famed prior attempt to deal with efficient provision of public goods with players of disparate preference intensities.
V Lindahl Equilibrium, Supply-Demand Arrangement Lindahl (1958) conceived of a provision scheme where each player reported how much of the public good he or she wants depending on the share he or she would be required to pay. 11 The cost shares would be determined such that each player desires the same amount of the public good. Formally, a Lindahl Equilibrium consists of individualized public good prices (or cost shares) (p L i ) i∈N (where the superscript L stands for Lindahl), a private good price which we normalize to 1, and an allocation (M L , (m L i ) i∈N ) such that for each i ∈ N :
11 Contrary to the view that the Lindahl Equilibrium is of purely theoretical interest, Lindahl actually intended it to be potentially useful in practice. In Lindahl (1958) , he framed the Lindahl Equilibrium as a "positive solution" to the problem of determining "just" tax burdens on asymmetric taxpayers, and discusses extensively the potential challenges and the corresponding solutions in applying the Lindahl Equilibrium to the real world. and the market clears:
The next proposition shows that the Lindahl Equilibrium exists and is unique in our context.
Proof. Buchholz, Cornes, and Peters (2008) establishes the existence and uniqueness of the Lindahl Equilibrium in an economy where the utility function is formulated in terms of the public good and the private consumption good x i , and the production cost function h maps the amount of public good to the total contribution of the private good, under three assumptions:
Assumption 1. Each utility function is twice continuously differentiable, strictly monotone increasing in both variables and strictly quasi-concave.
Assumption 2. The public good is not a Giffen good for any agent.
Assumption 3. The cost function is twice continuously differentiable, h(0) = 0, h > 0,
Adapted to our case, x i = y i −m i , where y i is the endowment of the private good. The utility function can thus be written asŪ M,
The production cost function is h(M ) = M , which satisfies Assumption 3. Buchholz, Cornes, and Peters (2008) shows that Assumption 2 is satisfied if the utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, and
both of which are true in our case, the latter being −C i
Despite its achievement of Pareto optimality in the NCA problem, 13 the Lindahl Equilibrium suffers a grave defect: it does not recognize the incentive to ride cheaply. Thus, in our numerical example, the Lindahl Equilibrium has the nations contributing 1.414 and 0.354 respectively, which gives them net payoffs of 0.279 and 0.070 respectively. Here, however, the little nation has a simple threat to make to the big nation: 'I will not participate in the Lindahl Equilibrium. You can do so, or if you choose we can revert to the Nash Equilibrium.' The threat is credible, since the little nation is better off at the Alliance/Nash
Equilibrium than at the Lindahl Equilibrium. In many asymmetric situations, of course, no nation will be worse off at the Lindahl Equilibrium than at the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. 14 Nevertheless, the fact that the Lindahl Equilibrium simply ignores the fact that little nations do relatively much better at the Nash than at the Lindahl Equilibrium is critical. To get agreement, any solution must recognize this bargaining advantage of little nations, for the Nash Equilibrium is the fallback solution if an agreement is not reached. This implies that little nations are likely to balk at the Lindahl Equilibrium. For some parameter values, as we just showed, there will be a player who is strictly worse off at the Lindahl Equilibrium, who would simply hold out for the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. It is this player who would be in a favored bargaining position just because it was much smaller. It could be otherwise identical to the other players in terms of per capita income, exposure to threats due to insufficient provision of the public good, and costs of provision. 15 Let us now briefly step away from solving the NCA problem to propose another way of thinking about the Lindahl Equilibrium. Each player is in a position where he or she would like the other players to contribute more. He or she would be willing to contribute more at the margin if the other players were also willing to do so. We define the Supply-Demand Arrangement, or SDA, as one that starts by asking each player to define his supply curve as a function of the per-unit contributions from others. The Supply-Demand Arrangement just solves for the equilibrium where supply equals demand for each player.
Formally, a Supply-Demand Arrangement consists of individualized prices for the public good provided by others, (p SD −i ) i∈N (e.g., p SD −1 is the price that Player 1 pays for a unit that other players provide in total; the superscript SD stands for Supply-Demand), a private good price which we normalize to 1, and an allocation (m SD i ) i∈N , such that for each i ∈ N :
and the market clears:
Interestingly, and ultimately not surprisingly, the SDA has the nations contributing 1.414 and 0.354 respectively. This is precisely the outcome with the Lindahl Equilibrium. Indeed, this will always be the case; the two solutions are identical.
Proposition V.2. A Supply-Demand Arrangement allocation is identical to a Lindahl Equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Given a supply-demand arrangement ((p
Then for each i, (m SD i , M ) solves i's Problem (Lindahl) with price p i . The other direction can be similarly established.
The Supply-Demand Arrangement, being identical to the Lindahl Equilibrium, suffers from the same defect as the Lindahl Equilibrium: it neglects the incentive of players to ride cheaply. In solving any real-world NCA problem, as we have argued above, we must cater to the incentive of little nations to ride cheaply.
We now propose a mechanism that achieves our initial goal of solving the NCA problem despite cheap riding.
VI Efficient Provision Despite Cheap Riding
There are, of course, an infinite number of Pareto optimal outcomes. Our approach employs a method that takes account of differential incentives to ride cheaply, and at the same time is intuitively appealing, to get to some Pareto optimal outcomes. Our proposed mechanism, which we call a Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium (CREE), starts by establishing the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as a base point. The question then is how to proceed from there in an intuitively appealing manner that leaves no player worse off (so that players will not have the incentive to fall back to the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium), while achieving efficiency.
Here too, there are an infinite number of possibilities. The basic question is how the players should share the surplus above the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium on the path to the Pareto frontier.
We propose two alternative approaches to sharing the surplus over the Alliance/Nash Nash Equilibrium in individual participation. To our best knowledge, CREE is probably the simplest Pareto efficient mechanism in NCA goods provision games that achieves full participation, without the need to distinguish between signatories and non-signatories as is requested in many other mechanisms in the literature.
VI.I CREE-Nash Bargaining
The Nash Bargaining Solution provides an intuitively appealing way to proceed from the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium to the Pareto frontier while respecting cheap riding incentives.
Proposed in Nash (1950) , this formulation enjoys strong axiomatic support. Loosely speaking, a Nash Bargaining Solution is a vector of payoffs that maximizes the product across all players of the gains over some disagreement point. In our context, the disagreement point is necessarily the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. 17 Formally, a CREE-Nash Bargaining is an allocation (m CRE i + m N i ) i∈N such that:
subject to:
where (m N i ) i∈N is a Nash Equilibrium allocation and M N = i∈N m N i .
It is obvious that the CREE-Nash Bargaining is unique, Pareto optimal, and individually rational, under the conditions in Proposition V.1.
In our numerical example, the (unique) CREE-Nash Bargaining has the nations contribute (0.251, 0.123) in addition to Nash contributions, resulting in the total contributions (1.623, 0.209), and net payoffs (−0.213, 0.431), respectively.
VI.II CREE-Lindahl
In a CREE-Lindahl, the cost sharing scheme is such that each player will want the same 
taken to be zero or left unspecified. In applied work, the choice of the disagreement point depends on specific contexts. (See, for example, Horn and Wolinsky [1988] .) We emphasize that the Nash Equilibrium (rather than zero payoffs or any other consequence of disagreement) is necessarily the disagreement point in our NCA goods provision context. This is because the Nash Equilibrium, importantly, recognizes the cheap riding incentive of little players, the focus of this paper. and the market clears:
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium.
Proof. First, by Proposition IV.1, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium. Take the total contribution from that Nash Equilibrium. as M N and individual contributions m N i . Then, we can re-write the utility functions asŪ i (·, ·) = U i (· + M N , · + m N i ), so that Problem (CRE) is in effect the same as Problem (Lindahl) with utility functionsŪ i (·, ·). By Proposition V.1, there exists a unique Lindahl Equilibrium. Therefore, there exists a unique CREE-Lindahl.
In our numerical example, the ( We show in the next proposition that the CREE-Lindahl takes care of the cheap riding incentives, in the sense that each player prefers the CREE-Lindahl allocation to the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium allocation, and often strictly so. Intuitively, when asked how much of the public good above the Alliance/Nash outcome is desired at a given cost-sharing rule, any individual player can always choose to desire nothing (and thus to contribute nothing) on top of the Alliance/Nash outcome. Hence, they cannot be worse off at CREE-Lindahl than at the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, for a player who would contribute a positive amount at the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium and partially contribute in CREE-Lindahl, he or she would strictly prefer to participate in CREE- Lindahl. Indeed, since such a player would already have equated marginal benefit with marginal cost in Alliance/Nash Equilibrium, contributing a little bit more as specified in CREE-Lindahl would only be marginally more expensive, but would bring non-marginal benefit due to the non-marginal increase in the 'bang' in terms of the level of the public good. 
Evaluating that at M = 0, m i = 0 gives 1/p CRE 
VII Application to International Climate Agreements

VII.I Nordhaus Climate Club Proposal
We have proposed a mechanism, CREE, that 1) respects the cheap riding incentive (that is, no player is worse off than at the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium); 2) achieves Pareto efficiency (that is, no player can be made better off without making some player worse off); and 3) is intuitively appealing. In this section we evaluate the Nordhaus (2015) Climate Club proposal, an alternative solution to the climate agreement stalemate, along these dimensions. We will show that the key element of the proposal, a universal carbon price (UCP) arrangement, generally satisfies 2) and 3), but most importantly, fails 1).
In his seminal work on Climate Clubs, Nordhaus (2015) However, like the Lindahl Equilibrium, the UCP does not respect the cheap riding incentive. Thus, little nations are likely to find it individually irrational to participate in the UCP scheme. The likely result would either be that many nations would simply not join the Club, or that to get them to join the UCP would have to be set far below what is desirable. Nordhaus (2015) deals with the non-joiners' strategy by having members impose tariffs on the cheap-riding non-joiners. Whether such an arrangement could work in practice, given concerns about retaliation from the non-joiners, violation of existing trade agreements and other challenges, has been carefully considered by Nordhaus and hotly debated by others.
Addressing that debate would take us well beyond the concerns of this paper. But it is appropriate for us to point out that a UCP would simply ignore the bargaining power that little beneficiaries have when it comes to the provision of a public good.
Thus, major beneficiary nations, like the United States and China, which have by far the largest GNIs of any nations, would find a uniform carbon tax strongly in their interest.
However, nations with much smaller GNIs or populations, or lower per capita incomes, or nations much less affected by climate change, are nations that benefit much less at the margin. Little nations would correctly point out that the strategic situation tilts in their favor. They could feel entitled to impose a much lower carbon tax than the United States and China, the type of result to be expected in an Alliance/Nash Equilibrium.
Is it possible to amend the UCP to respect the cheap-riding incentive while compromising neither efficiency nor intuitive appeal? Some may propose having the smaller nations have a lower tax on carbon as a means to have a better chance of getting a significant tax, but that sacrifices Pareto efficiency. 20 An alternative solution would be to have everyone pay the same tax, thus achieving efficiency, but to have the big nations remit some of their own tax revenues to little nations. However, we doubt that this remedy would be politically feasible;
nations, or more accurately the citizens of nations, do not like to transfer major financial resources to directly benefit other countries. 21 Yet another approach, in similar spirit, would have big nations remit some of their tax revenue to some international or global fund, which would then be deployed to benefit all. But this too might be politically unattractive. Such concerns highlight the relevant strengths of our CREE solutions.
VII.II Testing the Alliance Equilibrium Model
We test the Alliance Equilibrium model (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) presented in Section IV utilizing the emissions-reduction pledges made by individual nations for the Paris Climate Change Conference as the measure of the nation's contributions. In particular, we focus on the important implication of the Alliance Equilibrium model that big nations pledge disproportionately more relative to the size of their economies than little nations. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) tested, among other things, whether big nations contributed disproportionally more to defense than did little nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 22 They collected data on the GNP and the defense budget as a percentage of GNP for each member in NATO in 1964. They then calculated the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and the Kendall partial rank correlation coefficient for those two variables.
They found them to be statistically significant. Sandler and Murdoch (1990) use systems of demand equations to distinguish between Nash and Lindahl behavior. They find support for Nash behavior for five of the ten sample NATO allies, while no evidence of Lindahl behavior is found. 23 That being said, vulnerable nations might have incentive to appear to contribute a lot for role-modeling purposes. They might say: "Look, if we do not contribute much, others will ask if we are really crying wolf, if we really care." having a very high per capita income, contributed vastly less than the United States. Moreover, with NATO in the 1960s, there was an established organization that had some ability to get little cheap riders to contribute more. Maybe Germany, France, and Luxembourg would have contributed relatively even less had this overarching organization not existed.
Despite our beliefs, our empirical analysis also controls for the confounders in the climatechange-mitigation context when calculating the rank correlation across nations between the amount of reduction per unit of Gross National Income (GNI) and GNI. In particular, we attend to vulnerability using three measures: 1) vulnerability measures including the percentages of urban and rural population living in coastal areas where elevation is below 10 meters (CIESIN/Columbia University, 2013), historical annual average temperature, and the percentage of population subject to drought, flood, and extreme temperature events; 2) per capita GNI; 3) pollution measures, including energy use from fossil fuels, NO x emission, and PM 2.5 concentration. These data, except for the first vulnerability measure, are all from the World Bank (2015). We also include 4) environmental concern measures including the percentage of World Values Survey (2016) subjects who respond positively to environmentrelated questions on active membership in environmental organizations, importance of looking after the environment, protection of environment over economic growth, participation in environmental demonstration for the past two years, and confidence in environmental organizations.
Our context differs from Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) To convert these pledges to an absolute amount of reduction, we need to estimate the BAU emissions. For the three big emitters, there are existing analyses that take care of the fine details of the emission determinants. These three are China, 26 the United States, 27 and EU-28. 28 For them, we take their BAU emission forecasts from those reports. For the rest, we use nation-wise autoregression models to forecast their BAU emissions in 2030, drawing upon Aldy, Chen, and Pizer (2016) . 29 Specifically, we regress the current log per capita carbon emission on the previous-year log per capita carbon emission, log population density, log per capita GDP, and a linear time trend, using data up to 2012, the last year for which the carbon emissions data are available from the CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2015). We employ the estimated coefficients to forecast each nation's 2030 carbon emission by relying on the population and GDP forecasts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2015), and by iteratively using the prior year's carbon emission forecasts. We then calculate the absolute amount of reduction from the 2030 BAU emissions for the pledges. 30 For nations that 25 We focus on unconditional reductions, as opposed to conditional reductions, to be consistent with our Alliance/Nash Equilibrium formulation. 26 Energy Research Institute (2009) of China predicts that the BAU emissions will be around 12,500 million tons in 2030. For readers concerned about strategic over-reporting by the Chinese government, that forecast is within the range of 8,000-18,000 million tons of energy-related BAU emissions generated by 12 engineering or general-equilibrium modeling platforms reviewed in Grubb et al. (2015) . It is also below what our autoregression model would have predicted. 27 The U.S. Department of State (2015) synthesizes multiple data sources and predicts the BAU carbon emissions to be 5,705 million tons in 2025.
28 European Environment Agency (2015) predicts that EU-28's BAU GHG emissions in 2030 will be 27% lower than the 1990 level. We assume a proportional reduction in the BAU carbon emissions in our analysis. 29 We choose nation-wise autoregression models because we find that they achieve a much smaller mean squared forecasting error of the aggregate carbon emissions on the last five years of available data, than other major carbon forecasting models, including Holtz-Eakin and Seldes (1995), Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) , and Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) . 30 We use carbon emissions despite the fact that many pledges are in terms of GHG emissions. The reason is that the historical data on individual nations' GHG emissions are very limited. We hence trade off the match with the pledges for the accuracy of forecasts, and assume that the reduction in carbon emissions will be proportional to that in GHG emissions. The carbon emissions that we use do not include land use, land-use change, and forestry activities emissions, which is consistent with the practice of most pledges. Calculations available from the authors.
submitted pledges with reduction goals, the reduction is calculated by taking the difference between our BAU emission estimates and the emission target indicated or implied in each individual INDC.
To nations that submitted pledges without a reduction goal, we assign a more negative normalized reduction (hence are less likely to bind) than that of the most non-binding pledge we have estimated; we treat those nations as less generous than those which state explicit reduction goals in their INDCs. For nations that did not submit a pledge at all, we assign an even more negative normalized reduction; we treat them as the least willing to abate.
We report the Pearson rank correlation test results in Table II . The rank correlation coefficient between the reduction per dollar of GNI and GNI is positive and highly significant.
This means that nations with larger GNI's pledge disproportionally greater reductions relative to their GNI's. This is consistent with our hypothesis that GNI is a dominant measure of nation size in the climate-change-mitigation context. Per capita GNI produces a positive rank order correlation as well. This is due in part to the fact that nations with smaller per capita incomes are little developing nations with small GNIs. The vulnerability measures, as we expected, are not valid measures of nation size in terms of producing big contributions.
Indeed, they point in the other direction. We believe once again that the negative rank order correlation in this context comes about because most highly vulnerable nations have small GNIs. Table III shows that GNI persists as a robust measure of size in the climate-change-mitigation context after controlling for per capita wealth, vulnerability, pollution and citizens' environmental concern, while per capita GNI has no relationship.
This is the prime implication of the Alliance Model that we conjectured above. 
VIII Conclusion
This analysis starts by observing that for many important public goods, including those provided by nonprofit organizations and collections of nations, there is no central authority to both provide the good and levy the exactions to pay for it. While negotiating to efficiency is conceivable when players are symmetrically situated, achieving an efficient level of provision with players whose circumstances differ substantially, as is the case with international public goods, encounters the challenge of nations' differential incentives to ride cheaply.
We propose the Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium, which recognizes the incentives of players, particularly little players, to ride cheaply. It starts with the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium, and then employs the principles of either the Lindahl Equilibrium or the Nash Bargaining Solution to progress to the Pareto frontier.
The mechanism respects the cheap-riding incentive, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. 31 31 The solution is Pareto optimal given the constraint that contributions must be in kind. Thus, in the To be sure, there are other ways to advance beyond the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium. Our proposal, we believe, capitalizes on a well known, and axiomatically justified, bargaining solution (for CREE-Nash Bargaining), or has important advantages as a focal point (for CREE-Lindahl).
We then apply our theory to climate change mitigation, probably the most famed international public good. We discuss the Climate Club approach proposed in Nordhaus (2015) , and point out that it ignores the bargaining power that little nations have when it comes to the provision of a public good. We then empirically test the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium model against against the emissions reduction pledges made by individual nations for the Paris Climate Change Conference held in December, 2016. The results show that GNI is a robust and valid measure of nation size in the climate mitigation context, as in the NATO context studied by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . Big nations in terms of GNI contribute disproportionally more to the public good than do little nations.
As citizens of the two nations that lead the world in size-of-economy and GHG emissions, we recognize that our work here (inadvertently) reveals the weak bargaining positions of our homelands. It seems inevitable that they will have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden if there is to be an effective agreement to arrest climate change through significant reductions in GHG emissions. The leaders of our homelands seem to have grasped this when, as early as in November 2014 and then again months before the Paris Conference, they issued two US-China Joint Announcements on Climate Change outlining their ambitions and commitments. Implicitly, these announcements simultaneously recognized the inevitable inadequacies of any agreement that might result should they, the biggest players, insist on proportional burden sharing; and hinted at the ultimate potential for "agreed riding", a forceful, albeit unbalanced, agreement that respects the bargaining strength of smaller nations.
climate-change-mitigation context, each nation cuts its own emissions. It would obviously be beneficial to relax this constraint, and allow big nations to pay smaller nations, or expensive-cut nations to pay inexpensive-cut nations, to assume some of their reduction burdens. Footnote 21 provides such an example from the Paris Agreement.
A Appendix: Imperfect Substitutability
Most of our analysis carries over obviously to cases where individuals' contributions may not be perfectly substitutable but still count positively towards the public good: M = M (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) where ∂M ∂m i > 0 for all i. While direct GHG reduction from anywhere on the Earth is perfectly substitutable, since the atmosphere mixes, other efforts that could could lead to GHG reductions may not be. For example, 1 unit of research time spent by a technologically advanced company is likely more productive than the same amount of time by a company that is behind the research frontier.
Our analysis above will be readily carried over to the imperfect substitutability cases where we can establish the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium for those cases. Below we provide a sufficient condition. there is at most one Nash Equilibrium. The existence part of Proposition IV.1 shows that an Nash Equilibrium exists.
